Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Paul Shurtleff, Max S. Andrews, Ned Shurtleff,
Harvey R. Carson And Garry R. Cole, General
Partners, Dba American Sales Company, (Asco), A
Utah Limited Partnership v. Jay Tuft & Company, A
Utah Corporation : Appellant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.JAMES A. McINTOSH; Attorney for AppellantCLARK W.
SESSIONS; Attorney for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Shurtleff v. Tuft & Co., No. 16470 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1767

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL SHURTLEFF, MAX S.
ANDREWS, NED SHURTLEFF,
HARVEY R. CARSON and GARRY
R. COLE, General Partners,
dba AMERICAN SALES COMPANY,
(ASCO), a Utah Limited
Partnership,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
Case No. 16470

vs.

JAY TUFT & COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court
for Salt Lake County
Honorable James S. Sawaya
JAMES A. McINTOSH
McMURRAY & ANDERSON
36 South State Street
800 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for Appellant
CLARK W. SESSIONS
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street
Twelfth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Attorneys for Respondents

F ~ l ED
MAR 211980
.....----Cbr\ Su;:mH-:rn Cocrt, U·:Jh

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . .

3

POINT I. THE JURY VERDICT AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS
FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS
AND SEVENTY-THREE CENTS ($15,651.73) FOR REPAIRS
TO THE BACKHOE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
BUT IS BASED UPON SPECULATION, CONJECTURE, PASSION,
AND PREJUDICE . . . . .

.

.

. 9

1.

The mechanics sent out bz Shurtleff & Andrews
Construction Co. to repair the backhoe were
incompetent to make the repairs according to
the generally accepted standards of good workmanship prevailin in the comm.unit , and the
were, in act, responsi e or t e rea own
of the backhoe . . . . . . .
. . . . . 9

2.

There was no evidence of any operator abuse
on the part of the defendant insofar as the
repairs to the backhoe were concerned.

. . . . . 20

3.

.

4.

5.

The testimony of all the ex¥ert witnesses
who interpreted the terms o the lease afreement accordin~ to the custom and usa~e ? those
terms in the industr~ stated the ~laintiff
should make the repairs free of c arge . . . .
arties
or t e repairs

There was
requiring

.

. . 26

. . 31

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

. 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

7.

The plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched
it the amounts charged for repairs are
sustained by this court . . . . . . . . .

. . . . 34

POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ALLOWING RAY BALDWIN, A MECHANIC FOR SHURTLEFF &
ANDREWS CONSTRUCTION CO. TO GIVE HIS OPINION THAT THE
BACKHOE HAD NOT BEEN MAINTAINED IN A PROPER CONDITION
BECAUSE THE MECHANIC HAD NEVER SEEN THE BACKHOE
OPERATED IMPROPERLY, HAD NEVER TALKED TO ANY OF THE
DEFENDANT'S OPERATORS ABOUT HOW THEY OPERATED THE
BACKHOE, ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT
HAD BEEN OPERATED PROPERLY OR NOT, AND BECAUSE THE
MECHANIC HIMSELF WAS THE PRINCIPAL OPERATOR OF THE
MACHINE FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO THE TIME THE
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WAS DETERMINED TO BE CONTAMINATED . . . . . 35
POINT III. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS, HAROLD
BABCOCK TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE MERCHANTABLE
CONDITION OF THE BACKHOE BECAUSE SUCH TESTIMONY
MUST COME FROM EXPERT WITNESSES AND IT WAS
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE DEFENDANT'S
COUNTERCLAIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . 38
POINT IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO ADMIT EXHIBIT D-44 INTO EVIDENCE
WHICH WAS A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE PROBLEMS
WITH THE BACKHOE, BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVANT TO THE
MERCHANTABLE CONDITION OF THE BACKHOE . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
POINT V. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NOS. 25 AND 29 BECAUSE THE
SAID INSTRUCTIONS ARE AN INACCURATE STATEMENT
OF THE LAW fu.~D ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . 45

POINT VI. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20 DEALING WITH WAIVER
BECAUSE IT USURPS THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY TO
WEIGH THE EVIDENCE AND AMOUNTS TO A DIRECTED
VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ON THIS ISSUE . . . . . . . . . 48

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

CASES CITED
Christianson v. Debry, 23 U. 2d 334, 463 P. 2d 5 (1969). .

.37

Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 557 P. 2d 1009
(Utah 1 9 7 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 39, 44, 46
Day Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 U. 2d 221,

. 408

p.

2d 186 (1965). . .

.37

Durrant v. Pelton, 16 U. 2d 7, 394 P. 2d 879 (1964).

.49

Flynn v. Harlin Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 327,

509 P. 2d 356 (1973) . . . . . . . . . .

.49

Francis v. City and County of San Francisco, 282 P.
2d 456 (Calif. 1955) . . . . . . . . . .
Gull Laboratories Inc. v. Louis A. Rosser, Co.,
589 P. 2d 756 (Utah, 1978) . . . . . . . .

.47
.43, 44

Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 260 P. 2d 549
(Utah, 1953). . . .
. .....

.39

Ieronimo v. Hagerman, 93 Ariz. 357, 380 P. 2d 1013 (1963).

.47

Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 U. 2d 427, 367 P. 2d 464 (1962) . .

.33
.47

Smith v. Aberdeen, 7 Wash. App. 664, 502 P. 2d 1034 (1972) .

. 47

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CITED
Rule 17 . .

.33

Rule 17(a)

.34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE CITED
Rule 67 . . .

43' 44

Rule 70(1)(f)

43' 44

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES CITED
31 Am. Jur. 2d 712-714, Expert and Opinion Testimony . . . . . . 39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iv

E~

THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL SHURTLEFF, MAX S.
ANDREWS, NED SHURTLEFF,
HARVEY R. CARSON and GARRY
R. COLE, General Partners,
dba AMERICAN SALES COMPANY,
(ASCO), a Utah Limited
Partnership,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
Case No. 16470

vs.
JAY TUFT & COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover unpaid rental in the amount of
twenty thousand six hundred forty-seven dollars and seventy-five
cents ($20,647. 75) allegedly due on the lease of a used model 35
American backhoe, serial no. 330W.

The action also seeks to recover

fifteen thousand six hundred fifty-one dollars and seventy-three
cents ($15,651.73) for unpaid repairs made on the said backhoe
during the lease term.

The defendant filed a counterclaim based on

breach of express and implied warranties and negligence.

The

counterclaim requested certain damages for alleged loss of profits
which occurred because the backhoe was not merchantable in that it
sustained substantial
repairs and down time during the lease term
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and also because certain mechanics were incompetent and unable to
repair the backhoe; thereby making it necessary for the defendant to
lease other equipment which operated at a reduced efficiency.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya sitting
with a jury of seven women and one man on April 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
18, 19, 20, and 23, 1979.

[R. 249].

The jury returned its verdict

awarding to the plaintiffs the sum of thirty-six thousand three
hundred and seventy-six dollars and nineteen cents ($36,376.19)
which was the total amount requested less four hundred and eighty
dollars ($480.00) for an admitted credit which had not previously
been given to the defendant.

[R. 386].

One of the jurors, Dawna

Probst, found in favor of the defendant on its counterclaim and
would have awarded damages for loss of profits.

[Tr. 985] .

Thereafter

on May 1, 1979, the defendants served upon the plaintiffs the
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW
TRIAL.

[R. 396].

The said motion was denied by the Honorable James

S. Sawaya in that certain ORDER dated May 11, 1979.

[R. 398].

On

May 16, 1979, the defendant filed its NOTICE OF APPEAL appealing
from the JUDGMENT ON VERDICT OF JURY, a copy of which was attached
to the said NOTICE OF APPEAL.

[R. 403].

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to reverse the JUDGMENT ON VERDICT OF JURY
appealed from and to have this Honorable Supreme Ccurt set aside the
jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs the sum of Fifteen Thousand Six
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Hundred Fifty One Dollars and Seventy-Three Cents ($15,651. 73) in
repairs to the backhoe and to order a new trial on the remaining
issues raised in the plaintiffs' COMPLAINT dealing with alleged
delinquent rentals and in the defendant's COUNTERCLAIM dealing with
loss of profits on the Alpine job.

RECORD REFERENCES, DESIGNATION OF EXHIBITS, AND IDENTIFICATION
OF THE PARTIES
For purposes of clarification, the three-volume transcript
prepared by the court reporter will be referred to as [Tr.], and any
reference to the official record other than the court reporter's
transcript will be designated as [R.].
Some of the exhibits are enlarged documents fastened onto
pieces of cardboard.

These enlarged exhibits measure approximately

24" X 40" and are more appropriately in the nature of "charts".

In

order to clearly identify which exhibit is being discussed, the
defendant will refer to the "regular" exhibits as [Ex. P-2], [Ex. D15], etc.; and the "enlarged" documents will be referred to as [Ex.
D-3(chart)], etc.

The defendant hopes this explanation will assist

the court to more readily find the particular exhibit.
The parties will be referred to in this brief as plaintiffs and
defendant, the way they are identified during the trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant is a Utah corporation engaged primarily in
building water and sewer lines for municipalities under competitive
contract bidding [R.797].

The plaintiff, American Sales Company,
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(hereafter referred to as ASCO) is a Utah limited partnership.
~l

of plaintiff's Complaint-R. 2].

[See

ASCO's general partners were

Paul Shurtleff, Max S. Andrews, Ned E. Shurtleff, Harvey R. Carson
[R. 2].

and Garry R. Cole.

ASCO sold and rented backhoes and all

types of dirt equipment such as rollers, compactors, etc.

[Tr. S].

One of the general partners, Harvey R. Carson, was the manager of
ASCO.

[Tr. S] .
On or about March 23, 1977, the parties executed an EQUIPMENT

LEASE AGREEMENT [Ex. P-1, Ex. D-3(chart)]. In this agreement, the
defendant leased from the plaintiff American Sales Company one (1)
used American hydraulic backhoe model 3S, serial number 330W equipped
with a two (2) cubic yard bucket.

Plaintiffs' witness Darrell

Lester stated this was one of the shorter lived pieces of equipment
in the industry.

[Tr. 206-207]. The monthly rental was forty-eight

hundred dollars ($4,800.00) per month plus applicable taxes.
Plaintiffs own witnesses admitted this monthly rental contained a
reserve for depreciation, repairs and maintenance to the backhoe.
[Tr. 7, S4-55, and 206).

The said monthly rental contemplated the

use of the backhoe upon a basis not to exceed eight (8) hours per
day and five (5) days per week and one hundred seventy-six (176)
hours per month [See

~8A.

of Exs. P-1 and D-3(chart)].

The lease

term was for a minimum period of thirty (30) days beginning on March
21, 1977, with rental payments becoming due and payable every thirty
(30) days.
Harvey Carson, one of ASCO's officers, testified that prior to
the execution of Exhibit P-1, the plaintiffs' performed a "final
servicing" on the backhoe.

[Tr. 44-4S].

The purpose of this

service was to put the backhoe in good operating condition so when a
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customer takes it out there are no defects in it.

[Tr. 45].

Plaintiffs witnesses further admitted they knew the backhoe would be
used by the defendant to fulfill certain obligations under contracts
with municipalities which contained deadlines for completion.
790-792].

[Tr.

Mr. Carson admitted he represented the backhoe would be

able to do the work for which it was intended, had just been completely
serviced, and did not have any defects that he knew about.

[Tr.

45].

Notwithstanding these express warranties and representations
regarding the merchantable condition of the backhoe, it broke down
immediately'.

The very next day after it was delivered to the Murray

job site, the left axle broke.

[Ex. P-6].

The defendant called

Harvey Carson who dispatched three mechanics from Shurtleff &
Andrews to repair the axle, to wit:
Gordon Taylor.

[Tr. 25, Ex. P-6].

Ray Baldwin, Chip Woods and
When they arrived at the job

site, they determined there were several other serious problems and
repairs that had to be made.

These included an alternator that

would not charge, a horn button that was missing, a counter-balance
that was leaking, a swing motor that was leaking on top, and other
hydraulic problems. [Ex. P-6].

The three mechanics spent a total of

twenty five and one-half (25 1/2) hours repairing the backhoe at a
cost of seven hundred twenty-eight dollars and twenty-eight cents
($728.28). [Ex. P-6].

The repairs were all itemized on a Shurtleff

& Andrews work order R0-070 dated 3/22/77.

[Ex. P. 6].

ASCO

acknowledged they were responsible for repairing all these defective
items, and did not pass on the charges to defendant.
From the day the backhoe was delivered to the Murray job site
on March 21, 1977, until the day it was picked up from the Alpine
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job site ten months later on January 23, 1978, the backhoe experienced
regular and serious disrepair, problems of all sorts, and substantial
down time.

[Exs. P-6, D-7 through D-17.

Tr. 752 et seq which is

a chronological summary of the defects].
The main categories of problems which the defendant experienced
on the backhoe were with (1) the axle which broke twice (once in the
Murray job site on March 22nd and again in the Wellington job site
on June 15th, less than three months later), (2) the charging system
(which required replacement of an alternator on the Murray job site,
and again on the Wellington job site as well as replacement of a
regulator, batteries, and other electrical parts); and (3) substantial and numerous hydraulic problems that are reflected in
nearly every invoice from March 22, 1977, through January 23, 1978.
[Ex. P-6 and D-7 through D-17].
The total cost of these repairs amounted to nearly sixteen
thousand dollars ($16,000.00) as noted on plaintiff's Exhibit P-22.
The down time which the defendant experienced during the ten month
period of the lease agreement because of the defective condition of
the backhoe was approximately 22 days as more fully set forth on
defendant's Exhibit D-45 (chart).
The problems with the hydraulic system became so serious that
by November 16, 1977, the backhoe could not operate at all because
the boom and bucket stuck in the trench and could not be lifted out.
[Tr. 541].

This created a dangerous condition which made it imposs-

ible to operate the backhoe any further until the problems with the
hydraulic system were corrected. [Tr. 541, 670-672].

At this point

the ASCO mechanics were also baffled, and although they were at the
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job site on November 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25,
attempting to fix the same problems with sticky valves which continued
to reoccur each day, they were unable to do so.

[Tr. 326-330].

Finally, by November 28, 1979, the entire hydraulic system broke
down and became so contaminated with metal filings and other impurities that it had to be completely flushed out and numerous parts
were replaced at a cost of some twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00).
[Tr. 326-330, Ex. D-14].

Even after this transfusion, the hydraulic

system still continued to malfunction and mechanics were sent out
for repairs on December 19, 1979, and January 6, 1980. [Tr. 326330].
The defendant Jay Tuft & Company was under certain contract
deadlines to complete the installation of the sewer line at Alpine.
When the leased backhoe broke down with the hydraulic problems, the
defendant asked the plaintiffs for a substitute backhoe in order to
meet its contract obligations.

[Tr. 794-796].

ASCO was the only

dealer in the State of Utah who had a model 35 backhoe.

[Tr. 794].

Although the plaintiffs had a substitute model 35 machine available
at their Salt Lake City offices, they refused to let the defendant
take it, presumably because they were negotiating for its sale to
other third parties.

[Tr. 794-796].

The said sale never materialized.

[Tr. 796].
After being turned down by ASCO, the defendant brought other
backhoes consisting of a Drott 50 and later a Cat 235 to continue
digging where the model 35 had broken down.

[Tr. 539-541, 543-544,

813-820]. The machines use the same crews as the model 35 backhoe;
however, since they were smaller, they were less efficient, and all
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the witnesses acknowledged this fact.
Exs. D-56 (chart), D-57(chart)].

[Tr. 544, 817, 932 et seg,

This loss of efficiency and down

time for repairs resulted in a substantial loss of profits on the
Alpine job and constituted the basis for defendant's COUNTERCLAIM.
[R. 152-157; Exs. D-56, 57(charts)].
The defendant refused to pay for the repairs to the machine
because it felt they were the responsibility of ASCO for the reasons
set forth in POINT I of the ARGUMENT herein.
896-897].

[Tr. 821-822, 843,

It also refused to pay more than the approximately

twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) it had already paid for
rental of the machine, until it could determine its own losses for
down time, repairs and loss of profits and other consequential
damages in connection with the repeated breakdowns in the machine.
Tr. 843, 897].
On January 16, 1978, the plaintiffs through their counsel,
Robert J. Neilson, sent a letter to the defendant stating that
unless the full delinquent amount which was claimed to be due and
owing was paid within five days of receipt of the letter, the
plaintiffs intended to terminate their lease agreement.

[Ex. P-2].

Thereafter, on January 23, 1978, the plaintiffs repossessed the
backhoe.
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POINT I
THE JURY VERDICT AWARDIHG TO THE PLAINTIFFS FIFTEEN THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-THREE CENTS ($15,651.73)
FOR REPAIRS TO THE BACKHOE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BUT IS
BASED UPON SPECULATION, CONJECTURE, PASSION, AND PREJUDICE.

1.

The mechanics sent out by Shurtleff & Andrews Construction

Co. to repair the backhoe were incompetent to make the repairs
according to the generally accepted standards of good workmanship
prevailing in the community, and they were, in fact, responsible
for the breakdown of the backhoe.
$36,376.19

[R. 386).

The jury verdict was for

This was the total amount requested

[Ex. P-22) less a $480.00 credit on the rent.
$15,651.73 was for repairs [Ex. P-22).

Of this amount

The defendant submits the

seven women on the jury did not understand the technical aspects of
the backhoe as related to the three general categories of repair, to
wit:

the two broken axles, the charging system which required

replacement of alternators, regulators, batteries, relay switches,
etc., and the hydraulic system which was under constant repair,
nor was there any evidence to support their verdict.
Plaintiffs' witness, Darrell Lester, admitted the American
hydraulic backhoe model 35 was one of the shortest lived pieces of
equipment in the industry.

[Tr. 206-207].

The backhoe in the

instant case had been purchased by ASCO in 1975, and by the time the
instant lease agreement was executed on March 21, 1977, it had
already been leased twice before by Jay Tuft & Company and also by
two other construction companies. [Ex. D-42, Tr. 110, 149, 639-643].
On March 21, 1977, it had approximately two thousand three hundred
and twenty (2,320) hours of operation.

[Ex. D-42).

It broke down
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the day after the defendant received it, necessitating a new
alternator, a new axle, and repairs to the hydraulic system because
of the counter-balance leaking, the swivel leaking, and the swing
motor leaking.

[Ex. P-6].

The hydraulic problems continued throughout the next ten (10)
months.

[Exs. D-7 through D-17].

During all of these times, the

defendant contacted Harvey Carson at ASCO and reported the defects
and problems.

Harvey Carson then assigned some of Shurtleff &

Andrews' mechanics to the job.

[Tr. 24-25].

Ray Baldwin was

assigned to nearly every work order pertaining to the backhoe during
the term of the LEASE AGREEMENT.

[See Exs. P-6 and D-7 through D-

17] .
Since nearly twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00) of the repairs
pertain to the decontamination of the hydraulic system, the defendant
will now briefly describe that system. [Mechanic Ray Baldwin Tr. 311316, 334-340; designer Charles Wienke Tr. 396-400, 438-461; owner
of construction business Harold Babcock Tr. 672-686, 697-698].
The hydraulic oil is put into the machine from a drum or other
container much like gasoline enters an automobile.

The oil then

goes to a storage reservoir which is not completely filled.
When the backhoe is started, the hydraulic oil is distributed throughoul
the system both by means of the pressure in the storage reservoir as
well as by certain motors and pumps in the machine.
The circulating oil first enters a main 25-micron hydraulic
filter which is similar to the oil filter in a car, but much larger.
This filter has a magnetic separator which is placed in the middle
of the filter from top to bottom.

This separator is made up of tiny

magnets. Both the filter and magnetic separator are safety devices
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installed by the manufacturer to remove metal particles, dirt, and
other impurities which are always present in the hydraulic system,
simply from normal operation. When the filters and magnetic separator
become clogged, they must be replaced.
witness,

The manufacturer's expert

Charles Wienke, stated that the filters do not need to be

replaced after any given number of hours of operation, but whenever
they become clogged.
The condition of the filter can be seen by a visual indicator
on the filter itself.

This visual indicator is a small flag which

can be easily seen by the operator by opening two metal doors and
looking at the filter.

This act takes less than three minutes.

If the flag is silver in color, the filter is okay.

is red, this means the oil is "bypassing" the filter.

When the flag
When the

oil is bypassing the filter, it can be easily observed from the same
"windows".

In this "bypass" condition, the oil goes over the top of

the filter rather than through it.
This "bypass" feature is important to the instant appeal.

When

the backhoe first starts up in the morning, the oil will bypass the
filter until it is warmed up. During this warm-up time, the red flag
will appear at the visual indicator.

During this time, the operator

will be able to observe the oil going over the top of the filter.
After the machine is warmed up, the oil then goes through the filter
and the red flag disappears and is replaced by a silver one.
The "bypass" system in the main hydraulic 25-micron filter
is a safety device installed by the manufacturer to allow the
hydraulic oil to get to the pumps and other moving parts in the
main motors and swing motors while the machine is warming up and
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during times when the main filter is clogges.

If this system didn't

exist, the pumps would starve from lack of oil and wou "cavitate"
or deteriorate.
If the filter is clogged with metal filings, dirt, particles,
and other impurities, the oil will continue to go over the top of
the filter even when the machine is warmed up.

This condition will

then alert the operator that he should change the filter element.
If he fails to change it, then the impurities in the oil will
continue to flow over the top of the filter and into the main hydraulic
system. These impurities can then become imbedded in valves, pistons,
and other moving parts causing them to stick and the hydraulic
backhoe to malfunction.

They can also cause other damage such as to

pumps by hitting against the pump blades, causing them to deteriorate,
etc.
The pumps will also deteriorate simply through normal wear and
tear without any problem of contamination in the system.

Once the

pumps start to deteriorate for whatever reason, they go out quickly
in a matter of three to four hours.

When they do deteriorate, they

also spew metal filings and other impurities into the system.
These impurities will be picked up by the main 25-micron hydraulic
filter and magnetic separator until the elements become clogged.
At that point, and unless the filter is replaced, impurities from
the deteriorating pumps, etc. will circulate in the system and cause
problems with the other moving parts.
After the hydraulic oil leaves the main hydraulic 25-micron
filter and magnetic separator, it circulates to other parts of the
system.

One of these sections contains the swing motor which turns

the backhoe around during operation.

Before the oil gets into the

swing motor, it goes through a 10-micron filter which, like the main
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25-micron filter, is there to filter out smaller impurities and to
protect the swing motor from contamination.

If the swing system is

not operating properly, there is a red light on the dash in the
operator's cab which comes on to alert the operator to a potential
problem.

This red light in the operator's cab is the only visual

indicator on the backhoe which deals solely with the swing system;
and is further the only visual means an operator has to alert him to
possible danger in the swing system.

Sometimes the operator can

detect a different noise in the swing motor if there are problems
with contamination.
or "yowling".

The witnesses refer to this noise as "whining"

[Tr. 397].

Another witness testified the motion

on the backhoe would become jerky and could be felt as the operator
swung the housing around.

[Tr. 680].

Another safety feature is a sight glass which could be
observed and which was installed by the manufacturer to allow an
operator to visually determine the level of the hydraulic oil in the
system.

[Tr. 399].

In conclusion, the manufacturer has designed at least four
safety devices to prevent the impurities in the hydraulic oil from
damaging the pump and other moving parts.

These are (1) the main

25-micron hydraulic filter, (2) the magnetic separator inside the
hydraulic filter, (3) the bypass system which allows oil to get to
the moving parts even though the filter and magnetic separator are
clogged, and (4) the 10-micron filter associated with the swing
motor and swing system.

These are also visual indicators on the

main hydraulic filter, and a red light in the operator's cab pertaining

-13-
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to the swing motor and system, as well as a sight glass to determine
the level of the hydraulic oil in the system.
The Shurtleff & Andrews' mechanics, Ray Baldwin and Chip Woods,
had been dispatched to the Alpine job site on October 28, 1977, to
repair the stick cylinder and to repack same at a charge to the
defendant of one thousand one hundred sixteen dollars and ninetyfour cents ($1,116.94).

[Ex. D-13].

Approximately two weeks later

on November 16, 1977, the stick cylinder again malfunctioned, making
it impossible to bring the stick or boom or bucket out of the
trench.

[Tr. 541].

The defendant called Harvey Carson who dis-

patched Ray Baldwin to the Alpine job site.

[Tr. 303].

It was at this point that the hydraulic system began to deteriorate rapidly resulting in a cost of nearly twelve thousand
dollars ($12,000.00) for a complete decontamination job which
required a major overhaul and the replacement of numerous parts in
the backhoe hydraulic system [Ex. D-14].
Mr. Baldwin stated that on March 16, 1977, he diagnosed the
problem as a plugged unloader valve that hung open allowing the
hydraulic oil to pass through.

[Tr. 305].

He testified he remedied

the problem, checked the controls afterwards, and made sure the
machine was operating properly that evening and then left. [Tr.
305].

He further testified he was called back the very next day on

November 17th to take care of exactly the same problem that had
existed the day before.
the trench.

The bucket or boom was off to the side of

[Tr. 306-307] .

In order to bring out the number of times that this "expert"
mechanic was on the job site to fix the identical problem, his
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deposition was published.

[Tr. 326].

He was asked about his

written statement which had been prepared by him and given to ASCO
and which was attached as Exhibit 1 to the deposition.
~]

.

[Tr. 326 et

He admitted each day he worked on exactly the same problem as

the day before, and thought he had fixed the problem each night when
he left the job site.

However, he admitted the next day the problem

existed and he had to go back out.

[Tr. 326 et

~].

He said he

was there on November 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, working
each day on the same problem he felt he had corrected when he left
the night before.
Ray Baldwin

[Tr. 32 6- 330] .
testified that from November 28th through December

3rd, three mechanics worked on completely decontaminating the
hydraulic system and replacing all the parts. [Tr. 326-330, Ex. D14].

Although by December 3rd, the hydraulic system had been completely

flushed out, and numerous parts had been replaced, the system
continued to experience problems.

Ray Baldwin came out again on

December 19th and later on January 6th to work on problems in the
hydraulic system.

[Tr. 326-330].

Mr. Baldwin was permitted to testify over objection by defendant's counsel that in his opinion the backhoe was not maintained
properly.

[Tr. 322].

When he was asked the question "What did Jay

Tuft not do that he should have done, in your opinion?" he stated
"the defendant should have visually inspected the main hydraulic
filter to determine whether it was plugged or not."

[Tr. 323].

The defendant submits it was negligence for Ray Baldwin not to
check the visual indicators on the hydraulic filters to determine
whether they were, in fact, contaminated.

This was a routinely
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simple operation, taking less than three minutes.

Since Mr.

Baldwin was permitted to testify over objection that the hydraulic
system was not properly maintained by Jay Tuft & Company and
since this conclusion of improper maintenance was based solely on
the grounds that Jay Tuft should have checked the visual indicators,
it follows ipso facto that if Ray Baldwin had a duty to check the
same visual indicators during the several days he was working on
the backhoe commencing November 16, 1977, that his failure to do
so would also constitute negligence.
Mr. Baldwin testified he did not believe he had any duty to
check the main hydraulic filter visual indicator since the
maintenance of the machine was routinely the responsibility of
Jay Tuft & Company. [Tr. 341-343].

However, the defendant submits

when it called ASCO and reported the repairs and when ASCO sent
certain mechanics to the field to take care of the repairs, that
the defendant had the right to rely on ASCO to get competent
mechanics to repair the hydraulic problems, and further that the
defendant had the right to expect these mechanics would be able
to diagnose a problem correctly and to take the necessary safeguards
which were needed to both correct the defects and to do so at a
minimum cost to the defendant.
Plaintiffs' own expert witness, Charles Wienke, the service
manager for American Hoist Company, Duluth, Minnesota, who designed
and manufactured the American hydraulic backhoe testified that a
service man such as Mr. Baldwin who had been called out to repair
problems such as a boom sticking in the trench and who was charging
the defendant for his time, should have inspected the main hydraulic
filter before he left the job each night to see if it was contaminated.

[Tr. 450].
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He was emphatic that a clogged filter would cause the pump
to deteriorate.

[Tr. 404-405].

He stated the backhoe has several

sources of contamination by virtue of its normal operation.

These

sources are (1) wear plates in the gear pumps and valve plates
and wash plates in the piston pump. [Tr. 404]

(2) The hydraulic

cylinder coming in contact with the ground and picking up rocks,
dirt and other debris.

[Tr. 405]

(3) Simply from the moving

parts giving out metal filings through normal use.

[Tr. 406]

(4) Metal filings as large as 40 microns in size that cannot be
purged at the factory and continue to come from the wear of parts
on the machine.

[Tr. 407].

Mr. Baldwin testified that during the first several days
beginning with November 16, 1977, he was working on the same problems
with the sticking unloader valves, and that each night the machine
was operating properly when he left the job site.
308].

[Tr. 305 and

However, Mr. Baldwin admitted that he did not check the

hydraulic filters.

[Tr. 323].

Mr. Wienke testified that if he had

been Mr. Baldwin, he would have checked the hydraulic filters before
testifying that the machine was operating properly when Baldwin left
each night, because sticking unloader valves would indicate some
unnecessary contamination in the system.

[Tr. 461]. Consequently,

the plaintiffs' own expert witness testified that Ray Baldwin was
negligent in the way he operated the machine by not inspecting the
hydraulic filters.
Mr. Baldwin made the following significant admissions bearing
on his negligence:
1.

He admitted that it was ten days to two weeks from the
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first time he went down to work on the hydraulic system until he
determined it was contaminated, even though he was at the site
every working day.
2.

[Tr. 387].

He, himself, never made any visual inspection of the

hydraulic filters for several days prior to the time he determined
the system was contaminated even though he was on the ground each
day working on exactly the same problem as the day before. [Tr.
323].
~-

He admitted that if he had replaced the pumps the first day

he was there on November 16th, the system would not have been as
contaminated as it was two weeks later.
4.

[Tr. 387].

If the pumps were going out, the contamination in the

system would be increased substantially each day up to the point of
plugging the filter.
5.

[Tr. 387].

He had not changed the pumps prior to the time in Alpine

and did not know how long they had been on the machine. [Tr. 383].
The mechanic, Ray Baldwin, stated in his opinion the system
had become contaminated because of certain pumps in the main
hydraulic system which deteriorated, thereby discharging metal
particles into the system.

[Tr. 318, 332, 339].

He further

admitted that metal filings will be in the system through normal
wear and tear just because of the hydraulic oil hitting the pump.
[Tr. 332].

In this connection he disagreed with plaintiffs' other

expert witness Charles Wienke who testified the pumps do not go
out first clogging the filter but rather the clogged filter causes
the pumps to deteriorate.

[Tr. 404, 405].

The defendant's

position is that if Mr. Baldwin had checked the hydraulic filters
several days before he actually did, he could have determined the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

filters were clogged just as easily as the operator could, and
the pumps could have been replaced at a nominal charge and the entire
system would not have to be decontaminated resulting in numerous
parts being replaced at a cost of $12,000.00.

[Ex. D-14].

Mr. Baldwin further admitted that even after the system had
been totally decontaminated and most of the parts replaced, that the
defendant still experienced problems with the hydraulic system.
[Tr. 326-330].

The defendant submits that the reason these future

problems were experienced, was because the mechanic, Ray Baldwin,
did not follow the operator's manual in the way he decontaminated
the system.

He merely flushed out the system rather than taking out

all of the parts and cleaning them separately as the operator's
manual suggested.

In this regard, the operator's manual was intro-

duced into evidence as Exhibit D-36 and the check list for the
decontamination procedures begins on page 150.

Mr. Baldwin's

testimony regarding the decontamination procedures begins at Tr.
351.

He admitted that he had not removed and dismantled the hydraulic

cylinders. He admitted that he did not take the track drive motors
out, nor did he remove the swivel assembly from the main deck and
disassemble and clean it thoroughly.

He further admitted that he

did not take the air cooler out and that he did not pull the travel
bank valves out.

[Tr. 351 et

~].

The defendant's expert witness, Harold Babcock, testified that
the manufacturer's recommendations for decontaminating the system
should be followed exactly and that the mechanics did not have the
right to substitute their own judgment for what the manufacturer
recommended.

[Tr. 686].

He testified that it was not satisfactory

to merely flush out the system rather than to take each part out
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separately and clean it because you could not be sure that all the
impurities were removed unless the system was both flushed out and
the parts were taken out and cleaned separately.

[Tr. 686] .

He

testified that if some of the impurities remain in the system, it
would cause the valves to stick and present other problems in the
hydraulic system.
2.

[Tr. 686].

There was no evidence of any operator abuse on the

part of the defendant insofar as the repairs to the backhoe were
concerned.
Since Mr. Baldwin was the expert mechanic dispatched to
repair the sticky valves for several days prior to the time he
checked the hydraulic filters, it appears clear if the operator
of the backhoe had a duty to check the filters before operating
each morning, that Mr. Baldwin had the same duty to check the
filters before he operated the machine each night after he completed
his repairs.

Mr. Baldwin had no right to rely on someone else to

take care of his work, especially when it would only have taken
less than two minutes to look at the visual indicators to determine
if the hydraulic filter had become clogged.

Plaintiffs expert

witness, Charles Wienke, who designed the backhoe and was a
service manager of the manufacturer testified he would have
checked the hydraulic filters each day.

[Tr. 450, 461].

The only other ground of operator abuse was that the defendant's
operators did not properly warm up the backhoe in the morning. The
plaintiffs EXPERT witness Charles Wienke testied that improper
warm-up procedures could cause "cavitation" of the pumps.
393-394, 397, 404].

[Tr.

This condition exists when the pumps don't
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get any oil and their gears don't have anything to move on.

This

creates a vacuum in the pump which will pull particles of metal
out of the pump.

He testified when the oil is cold and has a

high viscosity it doesn't want to run through the filter.

During

this time the pumps will have to "pull" the oil; instead of the
oil flowing routinely to the pumps.

He admitted if the proper

warm-up procedure is followed cavitation would not exist, and
further the bypass system on the main hydraulic filter is designed
to allow hydraulic oil to circulate to the pump under normal
warming up conditions.

The mechanic Ray Baldwin also testied the

bypass system is a safety device that allows oil to get to the
pump.

[Tr. 383).

Mr. Wienke testified this condition of cavitation

would spew metal particles into the hydraulic system where they
would be picked up by the filter. He further testied that an
operator could detect this cavitation condition by either looking
at the visual indicator or by the sound of the pumps which gives
off a whining, yowling noise which is a different sound than
would exist under normal operating conditions.
The plaintiffs

[Tr. 397).

attempt to use this testimony of cavitation

to "infer" the defendant's operators were negligent in not properly
warming up the backhoe.
is two-fold.

However, the ready answer to that "inference"

First Ray Baldwin was at the job site every day

from November 16, 1977, until he detected the plugged hydraulic
filter.

He operated the machine each night before he left and

did not detect either a whining, yowling noise or see any red
lights on the dash in the operator's cab.

Consequently he was

the "operator" each day and had as much or more duty than any of
Jay Tuft's employees to check the filter since he had been
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dispatched by Shurtleff & Andrews to correct the hydraulic
problems. Secondly, Charles Wienke's testimony of "cavitation"
caused by improper warm up procedures was never linked up to any
evidence of improper warm-up procedures and if the jury based its
decision on the grounds of operator abuse it was based on speculation.
conjecture, passion and prejudice.
None of the plaintiffs' witnesses testified thev ever
observed Jay Tuft's operators warming up the machine improperly.
Of the five witnesses called by the plaintiffs, three of them
never saw the backhoe being operated, to wit:
[Tr. 72] Darrell Lester, and Charles Wienke.

Harvey Carson,
[Tr. 422].

One of

the remaining two witnesses, Darrell Hulse, testified that he did
observe the backhoe on the Murray job site; however, it was under
working conditions, and he did not observe it during the warm-up
period in the morning. [Tr. 134].
made the following confessions.

The final witness, Ray Baldwin,
(a) The backhoe was being operated

properly by Jay Tuft's crews at the Decker Lake job.

[Tr. 286].

(b) He admitted that most operators will open the doors and look
at the visual indicator on the main hydraulic filter; however, he
did not know of his own personal knowledge whether the operator
on the Alpine job did or did not do this.

[Tr. 330-331]; (c) He

admitted he had never observed any of Jay Tuft's employees that
were not warming up the machine the way he had explained to them
it should be done.

[Tr. 369]; (d) He admitted he had never been

around the machine when it was warmed up and didn't have any
personal knowledge as to whether the operators were following the
correct warm-up procedures or not.

[Tr. 369].
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Defendant's witnesses all testified the defendant's operator
Darwin Rich was one of the best in the business, and was very
circumspect in warming up the backhoe.

[Tr. 493-495, 528-531;

572-573].
3.

The lease agreement which the parties signed and as

interpreted by the plaintiffs' own witnesses provided the
plaintiffs would make the repairs free of charge, and the
plaintiffs did, in fact, make similar repairs free of charge. The
lease agreement itself is silent as to who has the responsibility
to pay for the repairs to the backhoe.

[Exs. P-1, D-3(chart)].

Paragraph 6 of the lease states as follows: "(6)

The lessee

shall keep the equipment in good repair and condition and will
return the equipment in as good condition as when leased, including
final servicing, reasonable wear and tear excepted."

All of the

witnesses who testified as to what these terms meant in the
equipment leasing business, testified that the plaintiff, ASCO,
would have the responsibility to take care of all of the repairs
which existed in the instant case unless there was evidence of
operator abuse. [See ARGUMENT, POINT 1(4) infra].
However, there is also testimony by plaintiffs' own witnesses
which further establishes a policy by ASCO to pay for the three
major categories of repairs that existed in the instant case. The
defendant had two other similar leases with ASCO prior to the one
involved in the instant case. [Tr. 110].

One of these involved

the lease of the backhoe for a job in Vernal, Utah.

Mr. Tuft

testified the salesman, Darrell Hulse, had told him in Vernal
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that ASCO repaired everything on the machine but the outside
hoses and the bucket teeth.

[Tr. 872, 874].

Darrell Hulse did

not resume the stand to rebut this testimony; therefore, his
previous testimony regarding conversations with Jay Tuft and also
the policy of ASCO in paying for repairs on the backhoe must
stand.
Darrell Hulse admitted he had a conversation with Jay Tuft
concerning repairs and maintenance on the backhoe, and this
conversation took place just prior to the time the lease was
signed.

[Tr. 141].

Mr. Hulse's deposition was published and

when he was questioned about his comments on page 27 et

~.

he admitted he told Jay Tuft that if his company had any major
problems, such as if a pump or something goes out or something
serious goes wrong with the machine, that Jay Tuft would merely
have to call ASCO and they would come down and repair the machine.
[Tr. 145].

He admitted that ASCO would come out and make the

repairs free of charge if it was a major item and if it was not
the customer's fault.

[Tr. 145).

He admitted the major items of

repair that would be taken care of free of charge by ASCO would
be the axles, the alternator and generator or charging systems,
and pumps in the hydraulic system.

[Tr. 177).

When being asked questions about his testimony on page 28 of
his deposition, he stated that if pumps or other serious breakdowns
on the machine occurred that ASCO would repair them free of
charge and the only responsibility of Jay Tuft & Company would be
to maintain the machine and lubricate it on a daily basis.
176-177].

[Tr.

He agreed that it's only where operator abuse can be
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shown that the customer would have to pay for it.

(Tr. 176-177].

Mr. Hulse further testified that both he and Harvey Carson, one
of the owners of ASCO and also general manager of the business,
would sit down and determine as to any particular repair whether
they would charge the customer for it or whether ASCO would pay
for it. [Tr. 172].

He said the main factor that ASCO would use

in determining whether the customer should pay for the repairs or
ASCO would be if the customer had abused the backhoe.

(Tr. 173].

He further admitted that ASCO had the responsibility to take care
of the parts that wear out through ordinary wear and tear such as
a tube or a hose leaking.

[Tr. 146,173-175].

Harvey Carson

admitted that he was present when a conversation took place
between Jay Tuft and Darrell Hulse concerning the maintenance,
repairs and servicing of the backhoe; however, he himself did not
enter into the conversation and he could not recall any specifics
concerning it.

[Tr. 15, 42-43].

Mr. Carson did, however, admit

that fair wear and tear would require the hydraulic cylinder [Tr.
99] and tracks and pins [Tr. 74] to be replaced.
For the reasons set forth above, it appears clear the policy
of ASCO in making the repairs depended primarily upon whether
there was operator abuse or not.

If there was not operator abuse

shown, then ASCO would pay for major repairs such as the charging
system, axles, and pumps, and would also replace free of charge
those items that went out through normal wear and tear such as
hydraulic hoses, o-rings, etc.

This is the policy that had been

followed on the prior two leases, and there is aboslutely no
testimony that the plaintiffs charged Jay Tuft for any repairs on
the prior leases.
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Furthermore, insofar as the instant lease was concerned, it
appears the plaintiffs did, in fact, pay for all the repairs that
were made on the Murray job site on the March 22, 1977 work
order, and, the plaintiffs' office manager and bookkeeper, Darrell
Lester presented a further exhibit showing an additional three
thousand dollars ($3,000.00) of repairs paid for by ASCO during
the third lease term.

[Ex. P-21].

The defendant is at a loss to determine why some of these
repairs were paid for, and not all of them. None of the plaintiffs'
witnesses gave any reasons to help resolve this dilemma.

The

plaintiffs' witnesses did testify that the monthly rental of four
thousand eight hundred dollars ($4,800.00) included a reserve for
repairs as well as maintenance and depreciation on the backhoe.
[Tr. 7, 54-55, 206].

Since the monthly rental contains a reserve

for repairs and maintenance, it is unconscionable to allow ASCO
to collect a second time from the defendant.

This point of

unjust enrichment is more fully discussed in POINT 1(7) infra].
4.

The testimony of all the expert witnesses who interpreted

the terms of the lease agreement according to the custom and usage
of those terms in the industry stated the plaintiff should make
the repairs free of charge.

The only paragraph in the lease

agreement that deals with repairs to the backhoe is paragraph 6.
[See Exs. P-1 and D-3 (chart)].

This paragraph reads as follows:

"The lessee shall keep the equipment in good repair and condition
and will return the equipment in as good condition as when leased
including final servicing, reasonable wear and tear excepted."
We have already discussed ASCO's interpretation of this paragraph
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through its salesman Darrell Hulse.
testimony was pennissible

[See POINT I(3)]

This

because the lease agreement itself

does not define the terms, and parol evidence would therefore be
admissable. Furthermore, since ASCO prepared the lease agreement
[Tr. 78), it should be construed most strictly against ASCO in
the event there is any ambiguity, and the court so instructed the
jury.

[Instruction No. 18, R. 361].
Harvey Carson, one of the owners of ASCO was plaintiffs'

first witness.

[Tr. 3-4).

When defendant's counsel asked Mr.

Carson about what the words "reasonable wear and tear" as used in
paragraph 6 of the lease agreement meant in the industry, the
trial judge sustained an objection to the question.
117).

[Tr. 114-

The court stated:
"I don't think reasonable wear and tear is going to be
that difficult of a definition. These jurors are going
to be able to detennine just from conunon experience, as
far as I'm concerned. I've already got an instruction
in mind on that subject. I don't know if there is any
authority for it." [Tr. 117).
Later the trial judge changed his mind on this matter and

required testimony to interpret the words "reasonable wear and
tear" and "good repair and condition".

[Tr. 371-372 (Ray Baldwin);

Tr. 662 (Harold Babcock); 803-804 (Jay Tuft)].
The trial judge did not define either "reasonable wear and
tear" or "good repair and condition" in the court's jury instructions,
but did instruct the jury they could look to custom and usage in
the industry for the meaning of these terms.
19, R. 362].

[Instruction No.

The defendant submits the plaintiffs produced

absolutely no evidence on the issue of custom and usage and the
only testimony is that of Mr. Harold Babcock, and Jay Tuft,
described below who both defined the tenns in paragraph 6 to mean
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that, absent operator abuse, the equipment lessor will be responsible for all of the repairs made by ASCO in the instant case and
charged to the defendant.
The defendant called Harold Babcock as an expert witness.
His qualifications are set out at Tr. 651-661.

After ASCO

repossessed the model 35 backhoe from Jay Tuft, it was leased to
Mr. Babcock's company, Engineer Construction, Inc.

Mr. Babcock

had 35 years experience in the construction business [Tr. 652]
and his company was engaged in installing water and sewer lines
similar to that being done by Mr. Tuft.

He had leased or purchased

the backhoe, loaders, dozers, cranes, trucks, ditchers, pavers,
etc.

[Tr. 654-655].

He was familiar with the terms in leases

that were similar to those used in ASCO's lease.
Mr. Babcock then testified that insofar as the terms "ordinary
wear and tear" or "reasonable wear and tear" are concerned, and
as it applied to the instant lease and the model 35 backhoe, that
equipment lessors will take responsibility for normal wear and
tear.

[Tr. 663].

He stated they do not take responsibility for

any negligence or damage done by the operator.

[Tr . 6 6 3 ] .

He

testified filter elements themselves need to be replaced as they
become contaminated or dirty and those are the contractor's
responsibilities as are bucket teeth which are not covered by the
manufacturer.

[Tr. 663].

He said the equipment lessors would

replace all the axle system, the battery charging systems, and
the problems in the hydraulic system, unless there was proven
negligence on the part of the contractor.

[Tr. 663].

He testified

the component parts of the hydraulic system would be replaced by
the lessor free of charge such as the pumps, the motors, and the
lines.

[Tr. 663].
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Mr. Babcock was then asked concerning Ex. D-14 which itemized all of the parts and labor used in the repair of the hydraulic
system, and testified these would be items to be repaired free of
charge by the lessor, except possibly the filter.
further testified

[Tr. 665].

He

the term "reasonable wear and tear" would

apply to repacking the cylinders, including the boom cylinders,
the stick cylinders, and the bucket cylinders, as well as outside
hoses that wear out through vibration and aging. [Tr. 672-673].
This testimony was also corroborated by plaintiffs' mechanic Ray
Baldwin who was also permitted to testify as to fair wear and
tear in the industry.

[Tr. 371-72].

On cross-examination by plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Babcock
wwas asked what the language in paragraph 6 of the lease meant
when it said the lessee shall keep the equipment in good repair
and condition.

[Tr. 731].

He stated "that means to perform the

function of servicing and greasing as is normal in the industry.
To keep the machine greased and functioning satisfactorily and
handling it in that fashion."

He was then asked the question "In

the industry, the word 'repair' then would have no meaning?"
answered this question by stating "No.

He

If the machine was damaged

running into something, swinging into a tree or building or a
vehicle and something was jannned up against the motor, I would
feel that it would be the responsibility of the contractor to
get that fixed if it was going to cause more damage."

[Tr. 732].

Jay Tuft was also permitted to testify as to what the terms
"fair wear and tear" or "reasonable wear and tear" meant in the
industry.

[Tr. 801].

Again, the trial judge stated "I think we

have to have some testimony and some evidence to be able to
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define the term.

I don't think it's subject to interpretation

without some testimony."

(emphasis added) [Tr. 801].

Mr. Tuft

testified that he had equipment with other equipment lessors who
have repaired similar damage as repaired by ASCO and he has not
been charged for the same.

[Tr. 802].

He stated Arnold Machinery

Company replaced a hydraulic swing motor and also an axle.

[Tr.

803].
He was permitted to testify without any objection from
plaintiffs' counsel that all of the problems testified to earlier
that morning by his wife, LaRue Tuft [See her testimony Tr. 752
et seq] would have been taken care of and repaired free of charge
by the equipment lessor under the standard custom and usage of
the industry.

[Tr. 803-804].

He further testified that the

terms in paragraph 6 stating "the lessee shall keep the equipment
in good repair and condition" do have a certain meaning in the
industry.

[Tr. 804].

He stated this meaning was that the lessee

will grease the machine and change the oil and take care of any
operator-caused damage.

[Tr. 804], however, the lessee would not

be responsible to take care of broken axles or problems with the
charging system or the hydraulic system.

[Tr. 804].

Under these circumstances, the defendant submits the only
evidence in this case to assist the jury in determining what the
terms used in paragraph 6 of the EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT meant
was the testimony of Harold Babcock and Jay Tuft to the effect
that the equipment lessors would be responsible to repair the
three categories of defects and damages which were found to exist
in the backhoe and that said repairs should be done free of
charge to the lessee.
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5.

There was no contract between the parties requiring

the defendant to pay for the repairs.

The lease agreement does

not contain any requirement that Jay Tuft & Company pay ASCO for
any repairs that might be made on the backhoe.

[Ex. P-1]. The

trial judge himself admitted that there was no express contract.
[Tr. 218].

Furthermore, it is clear the work orders which it is

alleged the defendants employees executed, were between Jay Tuft

& Company and Shurtleff & Andrews Construction, a separate and
distinct entity from ASCO.
25, and 40].

[Ex. P-6 and D-7 through D-17, Tr. 24,

These work orders specifically state in part as

follows: "I, the undersigned, hereby represent to Shurtleff &
Andrews the following in consideration for Shurtleff & Andrews
undertaking the work herein specified.
through D-17].

II

[Ex. P-6 and D-7

ASCO's general manager, Harvey Carson, testified

several times that ASCO and Shurtleff & Andrews were separate
companies, [Tr. 24 and 25] and that all of the mechanics were
employed by Shurtleff & Andrews [Tr. 24, 25,40, 86, 120].
Nor is there any evidence of an implied contract.

Darrell

Hulse testified he told Jay Tuft to call ASCO if Tuft had any
problems with the backhoe and ASCO would take care of the problem
free of charge unless there was operator abuse.
POINT 1(3) supra].

[Tr. 145. See also

Harvey Carson testified that when he got the

call he dispatched mechanics from Shurtleff & Andrews to make the
repairs.

(Tr. 25].

Mr. Carson also admitted that Jay Tuft &

Company had had two prior leases over the last year and a half
using the same backhoe. [Tr. 110].

However, neither Mr. Carson

nor plaintiffs' other witnesses testified Jay Tuft & Company
agreed to pay for the repair work that was done, and the transcript
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is therefore silent as to any evidence that would support an
inference that there was a promise on the part of Jay Tuft &
Company to pay ASCO for the repairs.

Mr. Carson had a conversation

with Jay Tuft six weeks before the backhoe was repossessed, and
the amount of eleven thousand dollars ($11,000.00) being due for
the decontamination of the hydraulic system was discussed.
39].

[Tr.

At that time Mr. Carson admitted Tuft denied he had any

responsibility for the repairs and he wasn't going to pay for
them.

[Tr. 39) .

Jay Tuft's testimony was to the same effect.

[Tr. 821-822).
On the other hand, the record does show that the plaintiffs
paid for nearly eight hundred dollars ($800.00) worth of repairs
to the machine which were found to be necessary at the Murray job
[Ex. P-6] .

site.

This argues against any contract for Jay Tuft

to pay for the repairs. Furthermore, Darrell Hulse, the office
manager and bookkeeper, prepared an exhibit showing that there
were other repairs made to the backhoe approximating nearly three
thousand dollars ($3,000.00) which were not charged to Jay Tuft &
Company.

[Ex. P-21).

The policy of ASCO to pay for repairs for

major items such as axles breaking, charging systems going out,
and hydraulic systems becoming contaminated requiring the replacement
of pumps, etc. has already been discussed in reviewing the testimony
of Darrell Hulse, who was the only one of plaintiffs witnesses
who had any discussion with Jay Tuft about who was to pay for the
repairs.
6.

[See POINT 1(3) supra].
The plaintiff is not the real party in interest to

collect any amounts for repairs to the backhoe because the work
orders allegedly signed by the defendant's employees constituted
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a promise to pay certain amounts to Shurtleff & Andrews Construction
Company, a company distinct and separate from plaintiff American
Sales Company herein; and there was no evidence of anv assignment
of these work orders to the plaintiff herein.

Rule 17 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

As already

discussed, the work orders which it is alleged the defendant's
employees executed were a promise to pay certain amounts to
Shurtleff & Andrews Construction, an entity separate and distinct
from American Sales Company, the plaintiff herein. [Tr. 25, 40,
86, 120].

In order for American Sales Company to be able to sue

on the said work orders, it would have to be shown that there was
an assignment. [(Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 U. 2d 427, 367 P. 2d 464
( 1962)].

There is no evidence in the record before this court

that any such assignment was made.

If ASCO is allowed to recover

for these amounts, then Shurtleff & Andrews Construction still
has a right to sue on their written agreement, and the defendant
would be subject to a double payment.
In its AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM the defendant denied
there was any basis for the claim that defendant owed to the
plaintiff sums of money requested.

[R. 150-157]. In DEFENDANT'S

ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES and in answer to interrogatory
no. 3, the defendant raised the issue of Shurtleff & Andrews
being the responsible parties since they were the ones who supplied
the labor and parts for repairs to the backhoe.

[R. 158-172].

At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the defendant made a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it was not
being prosecuted by the real party in interest.

[Tr. 474-479].
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The trial judge denied the motion with this comment:
"I think that the evidence is sufficient and is adequate
and there is a basis upon which the jury might find that
there was a contractual obligation on the part of the
defendants to pay for service provided as between the
parties to this lawsuit. For that reason, I will deny the
mot ion . " [Tr . 4 79] .
As pointed out above in this brief, there was no contractual
obligation on the part of Jay Tuft & Company to pay ASCO for the
repairs.

[See POINT I (5) supra on pages of this brief] .

At the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint,
no request was made by the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
show that an assignment has been made from Shurtleff & Andrews to
ASCO; nor was any motion made to add Shurtleff & Andrews as a
party-plaintiff in the instant lawsuit. Had such a request been
made, Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
discretion to the trial judge to add or substitute the real party
in interest.

However, this was not requested by the plaintiffs

and was not done by the trial judge. It is clear from the record
that both the plaintiffs and the trial judge believed there was
sufficient basis in the evidence to show a contract between the
parties in this lawsuit, and the real party in interest issue was
not felt to be meritorious.
7.

[Tr. 474-479].

The plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched if the amounts

charged for repairs are sustained by this court.

It is clear the

jury did not allow any credit whatever for fair wear and tear in
the o-rings, repacking hydraulic cylinders, stick cylinders,
etc.; even though all the plaintiffs' witnesses admitted this
would be fair wear and tear for which the plaintiffs would be
liable.

[Tr. 99, 146, 175, 371-372, 448].

The plaintiffs' witnesses further admitted the monthly
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rental of four thousand eight hundred dollars ($4800.00) contained
a reserve for repairs, maintenance, and depreciation.

[Tr. 7, 54-

55, 206]. To allow the jury to award an additional sixteen
thousand dollars ($16,000.00) for repairs and maintenance constitutes
a windfall to the plaintiffs and is unconscionable.

Finally, the defendant submits the plaintiffs backhoe has
been substantially improved at defendant's expense to the point the
plaintiffs offered to sell the backhoe to Harold Babcock in his
lease which is dated April 1978 for eighty seven thousand dollars
($87,000.00) which is three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) more
than the plaintiffs offered to sell the same backhoe to Jay Tuft
some thirteen (13) months earlier.

[Exs. P-1, D-43].

The unjust result of all this is that the plaintiffs have
received back their backhoe which they offered to sell to Jay
Tuft & Company for eighty four thousand dollars ($84,000.00),
have received twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) in rent
already paid by the defendant, have received thirty-six thousand
dollars ($36,000.00) awarded by the jury, or a total amount of
nearly sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00) for rent and repair
during the time Jay Tuft had the backhoe.

POINT I I
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ALLOWING RAY
BALDWIN, A MECHANIC FOR SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS CONSTRUCTION CO. TO
GIVE HIS OPINION THAT THE BACKHOE HAD NOT BEEN MAINTAINED IN A
PROPER CONDITION; BECAUSE THE MECHANIC HAD NEVER SEEN THE BACKHOE
OPERATED IMPROPERLY, HAD NEVER TALKED TO ANY OF THE DEFENDANT'S
OPERATORS ABOUT HOW THEY OPERATED THE BACKHOE, ADMITTED THAT HE
DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT HAD BEEN OPERATED PROPERLY OR NOT, AND
BECAUSE THE MECHANIC HIMSELF WAS THE PRINCIPAL OPERATOR OF THE
MACHINE FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO THE TIME THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
WAS DETERMINED TO BE CONTAMINATED.
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Ray Baldwin, the mechanic from ASCO was dispatched to the
Alpine job site to repair the backhoe when the bucket and boom
could not be moved out of the trench.

[Tr. 303-304].

He further

testified that he was at the job site approximately eleven (11)
times from November 16th through January 7th working on the
hydraulic system.

[Tr. 326-330].

After testifying as to what he

did during those eleven (11) times, he was asked the following
question:

"Based on your inspection of the machine and the work

that you did do on these project, including the Alpine project,
can you tell us, in your judgment, whether the machine was and
had been maintained in a proper condition?" [Tr. 321].
An objection was made on lack of foundation and other
reasons that there was no showing Mr. Baldwin knew how the machine
was maintained, that he had checked any of the lubrication charts
to know the maintenance was improper or ever had talked with
the operators to determine whether it was maintained properly.
[Tr. 321, 322].

The only answer to this objection was that Mr.

Baldwin was an expert with seventeen (17) years of experience as
a mechanic, that he made an inspection of the machine and should
be able to give his opinion.

[Tr. 322].

Based on this status of

the record, the trial judge allowed Mr. Baldwin to answer the
question.

[Tr. 322).

No other witness testified the backhoe was maintained
improperly and there is no other testimony in the record in the
form of expert opinion directly supporting a jury finding there
was operator abuse or improper maintenance of the machine insofar
as the hydraulic system was concerned.

This Honorable Supreme

Court has held expert testimony as to the possibility of a cause
will not support a verdict if such testimony is the only basis
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upon which to arrive at a verdict. (Christianson v. Debry, 23 U.
Zd 334, 463 P. 2d 5 (1969)].
Furthermore, it is obvious from the transcript of Mr. Baldwin's
testimony that there was absolutely no foundation for his opinion.
At the time the witness was permitted to give his opinion, he had
testified as to the following:

(a) the backhoe was being operated

properly by Jay Tuft's crews at the Decker Lake job (Tr. 286];
and (b) He admitted that most operators will open the door and
look at the visual indicators on the main hydraulic filter;
however, he did not know of his own personal knowledge whether
the operator on the Alpine job did or did not do this (Tr. 330331].
Cross-examination of Mr. Baldwin reflected an even further
lack of foundation.

He testified (c) he himself never made any

visual inspection of the hydraulic filters for several days prior
to the time he determined the system was contaminated; even
though he was on the ground each day working on exactly the same
problem as the day before (Tr. 323]; (d) He admitted that he had
never observed any of Jay Tuft's employees that were not warming
up the machine the way he had explained to them it should be done
(Tr. 369]; and (e) He admitted that he had never been around the
machine when it was warmed up and didn't have any personal knowledge
as to whether the operators were following the correct warm-up
procedures or not.

[Tr. 369].

In the case of Day Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 U. 2d 221,
408 P. 2d 186 (1965) this Honorable Court held that a trial judge
erroneously permitted a highway patrolman who did not see an
accident to testify as to the point of impact, where such opinion
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was not supported by sufficient facts, and what meager facts were
testified to were not connected up or related to the opinion and were
inadequate to support the patrolman's conclusion; and this court
further held that the said error was prejudicial since the point of
impact was an important fact, if not a controlling one, to be determined by the jury in reaching its verdict.

Similarly in the instant

case the defendant submits it was prejudicial error for the trial
judge to allow Ray Baldwin to testify that the machine had been
maintained improperly when this was the controlling point to be
determined by the jury in reaching its verdict and when it was clear
Ray Baldwin's opinion was not supported by sufficient facts, and what
meager facts he did testify to were not connected up or related to the
opinion and were inadequate to support his conclusion on the state of
the record at the time he gave his opinion and thereafter.

POINT III

THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT ALLOWING
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS, HAROLD BABCOCK TO TESTIFY REGARDING
THE MERCHANTABLE CONDITION OF THE BACKHOE BECAUSE SUCH TESTIMONY
MUST COME FROM EXPERT WITNESSES AND IT WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
RAISED IN THE DEFENDAT'S COUNTERCLAIM.
The defendant's counterclaim alleged, among other things, a
breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

[R. 152-157].

The

counterclaim raised the issue of whether Article II of the Uniform
Commercial Code dealing with implied warranties in sales transactions
applies to leases.

[See

~6

of the counterclaim at R. 153].

Both

parties submitted trial memoranda dealing with the applicability
of the Utah Uniform Cornmercial Code to lease agreements.
214-223, 204-213].

[R.

The trial judge ruled that the said Uniform
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Commercial Code did in fact, apply to lease transactions.

(See

Instruction No. 21 (R. 364)].
The courts have unanimously held that such items as merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are matters for expert
testimony and cannot be left to the jury where such testimony is
lacking in the record.

[31 Am. Jur. 2d 712-714, EXPERT AND OPINION

TESTIMONY, Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales; 557 P. 2d 1009 (Utah
1976) Hooper v. General Motors Corp. 260 P. 2d 549 (Utah, 1953)].
Defendant's expert, Harold Babcock, was permitted by the
trial judge to testify as to what the terms "ordinary wear and
tear" or "reasonable wear and tear" meant in the equipment leasing
business insofar as it pertained to the instant lease and the
model 35 backhoe.

[Tr. 663].

When plaintiffs' counsel objected,

the court said "Well, certainly we're going to need a definition
of that term and I suppose it will have to come from those who
are familiar with its usage in the industry, so I think it is
relevant."

Mr. Babcock further testified as to the meanings of

the terms in paragraph 6 of the lease agreement requiring the
lessee· to keep the equipment in good repair and condition.

[Tr.

731] .
Mr. Babcock stated he had been in court during the time the
mechanic Ray Baldwin and plaintiffs expert Charles Wienke testified
and that he did recall Mr. Baldwin's experience working on the
machine and the number of times he testified that he was at the
job site and the type of problems he was working on.

[Tr. 669].

Mr. Babcock was then asked if he had an opinion whether a backhoe
with those kind of problems and as related to the lease agreement
[Ex. P-1 which was exactly the same kind of lease agreement Mr.
Babcock himself signed to lease the backhoe after it was repossessed
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by ASCO (See Ex. D-43)] would be merchantable or not.

[Tr. 669] .

This was a simple yes or no type question; yet the trial judge
sustained an objection to this question and stated "I think
that's something that this gentleman is not qualified to answer."
[Tr. 670].

The following question was then asked by the defendant's

counsel:
MR. McINTOSH:

Your Honor, in view of the ruling, would
it be the court's interpretation that
merchantable condition would not come
through expert witnesses, it is something
the jury would decide without any help
from them?

THE COURT:

That's my feeling.

MR. McINTOSH:

All right.

Based on this reply by the trial judge, the defendant did
not pursue the matter further, as it otherwise would have done.
It is obvious the trial judge would not permit any expert testimony
on the issue of merchantability or "fitness for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used" which is how the court
defined "merchantable".

[See Instruction No. 27, R.370].

The

trial judge appears to either believe the witness was not qualified
to answer questions dealing with merchantability or that "expert"
testimony is not admissible at all to prove the condition.
Mr. Babcock certainly was qualified by both schooling and
experience.

He had thirty five (35) years in the construction

business and was the president of Engineers Construction, Inc., a
Utah corporation engaged in the business of installing water and
sewer lines.

He held a registered professional engineer's rating

in four states and had used all types of heavy equipment, including
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dozers, scrapers, backhoes, loaders, ditchers, pavers, and was
familiar with various leases containing language similar to that
in the instant case and had, in fact, purchased and leased equipment
involving hydraulic systems, axle-driving systems, and batterycharging systems similar to those found on the American hydraulic
backhoe model 35 [Tr. 651-661].
The trial judge gave instructions dealing with merchantability
[Instruction Nos. 25-29, R. 368-372], and defined "merchantable"
to be at least such as
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description, and
(b) Is fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used.

[Instruction No. 27 (R. 370)].

By refusing to allow expert testimony on this issue, the
trial judge permitted the jury to speculate on whether the
backhoe would pass in the trade and would be fit for the ordinary
purposes for which the backhoe was to be used.
Since the issue of merchantability of thezbackhoe was the
foundation and the basis for defendant's counterclaim insofar as
lost profits and consequential damages were concerned, testimony
relating to this issue was critical to the defendant's burden of
proof on its counterclaim.

Under these circumstances the error

was prejudicial since it left defendants without the required
testimony on this critical issue and also permitted the jury to
speculate or to find that the defendant had not covered the
burden of proof.
The defendant submits the trial court's inconsistent ruling
in allowing expert testimony from both Harold Babcock and Jay
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Tuft as to the terms and provisions used in paragraph 6 of the
lease agreement, but stating that such testimony was not admissable
on the issue of merchantability of the backhoe, would further
tend to confuse the jury and mislead them into thinking that it
was not necessary to have expert testimony on the terms in paragraph
6 of the lease agreement and they could totally disregard the

testimony of Harold Babcock on those terms also.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY REFUSING TO
ADMIT EXHIBIT D-44 INTO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST
OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE BACKHOE, BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVANT TO THE
MERCHANTABLE CONDITION OF THE BACKHOE.

In the preceeding POINT III of this argument, the defendants
have discussed the issue of prejudicial error which was committed
by the trial judge in refusing to allow Harold Babcock to testify
as to the merchantable condition of the backhoe.

Under this

POINT IV, the defendant submits the trial judge went one step
further in removing from the jury certain documentary evidence
which bore solely on the issue of the merchantable condition of
the backhoe.
D-44.

This documentary evidence was in the form of Exhibit

[Tr. 746].
From the day the backhoe was delivered to the Murray job

site on March 21, 1977, until the day it was picked up from the
Alpine job site ten (10) months later on January 23, 1978, the
backhoe experienced regular and serious disrepair, problems of
all sorts, and substantial down time.

All of these matters dealt

with the "merchantable" condition of the backhoe.

These problems
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were summarized in chronological order on Exhibit D-44 which
defendant offered pursuant to Rules 67 and 70(l)(f) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence as those rules were interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court a few months before the trial in the case of
Gull Laboratories Inc. v. Louis A. Rosser, Co., 589 P. 2d 756
(Utah, 1978).
Exhibit D-44 was a summary of the problems which the defendant
experienced with the backhoe during the lease term.

The surmnary

was prepared by LaRue Tuft, office manager and bookkeeper of the
defendant [Tr. 258] from books and records kept in the normal
course of business.

[Tr. 743-745].

The surrnnary listed the exact

source where the information was obtained, that is progress
reports, telephone logs, ASCO invoices, Jay Tuft's diary and
journals, etc.

[Tr. 743-745, Ex. D-44].

All of the underlying

books and records referred to in the exhibit had been made available
to plaintiffs' counsel substantially in advance of the trial date
and the original books and records were in court for plaintiffs'
counsel to use in cross-examination.

[Tr. 743-746].

The original

sources were noted on the exhibit to make it easier for the
witness to produce the original source documents during crossexamination by plaintiffs' counsel.
The court refused to admit this exhibit.

[Although the

transcript does not reflect the court's refusal to allow the
exhibit, the official exhibit sheet itself shows Exhibit D-44 was
offered but refused.

(R. 250).

And the transcript shows the

court did discuss this matter with counsel in chambers.
748)].

(Tr. 747-

Plaintiffs' counsel objected to the exhibit being

admitted simply on the grounds that it was hearsay.

[Tr. 745-
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746).

Since business records are an exception to the hearsay

rule pursuant to Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, it is
clear this objection was not a valid one and the court should not
have sustained it.
The defendant submits the summary was admissable pursuant to
Rule 67 and 70(l)(f) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as construed
by the Utah Supreme Court in the Gull Laboratories case supra.
The summary would certainly have been helpful to the jury in the
jury room in reviewing all of the chronological problems that
occurred with the backhoe.

This information would have been

helpful to them in resolving both the issues as to whether the
mechanics were competent to make the repairs as well as the issue
of whether the backhoe itself was merchantable. [Christopher v
Larson Ford Sales, supra]. Since these issues were so germane to
both the plaintiffs and the defendant's case, it is clear the
error in refusing to admit them was prejudicial.
The trial judge did allow LaRue Tuft to testify generally as
to the problems with the backhoe and to use the exhibit to refresh
her memory.

[Tr. 752 et seq).

And it is true that some of the

problems were generally reflected on Exs. P-6 and D-7 through D17 which are the charges ASCO made to the defendant with the
Shurtleff & Andrews work orders attached.

However, these exhibits

do not indicate many of the problems that were noted on phone
logs, progress reports, daily diaries and other documents which
were more fully identified on Exhibit D-44.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING
INSTRUCTION NOS. 25 and 29 BECAUSE THE SAID INSTRUCTIONS ARE AN
INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH
INSTRUCTION NO. 27.
Instruction No. 29 reads as follows:
In this case the burden of proof with respect to
the applicability of the implied warranty of merchantability rests upon the defendant to s~ow by a preponderance
of the evidence that the backhoe was in a defective
condition at the time the lease commenced on March 21,
1977, and that there was no change in the mechanical
condition of the backhoe from the time the lease
commenced until such time as the backhoe experienced
the mechanical difficulties in question. In the absence
of proof of a defect in the backhoe on March 21, 1977,
the plaintiffs may not be held liable on a theory of
implied warranty.
[R. 372].
Instruction no. 25 is similar in content.

[R. 368].

The

court's nstruction Nos. 25 and 29, were copied verbatim from the
plaintiffs' proposed instruction nos. 5 and 13. [R. 312 and 304].
The defendant took an appropriate formal exception to these
instructions on the same grounds and for the same reasons as set
forth in this POINT V.

[Tr. 980-982].

These instructions state in affect, that unless all of the
troubles with the backhoe originated and existed on March 21,
1977, there is absolutely no way the plaintiffs can recover on a
breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

The defects and

problems with the backhoe are set forth in chronological order in
Exhibit D-44 which is discussed infra Point IV.

These defects

are also set forth in the testimony of LaRue Tuft [Tr. 752 et
~],

and generally in Exhibits P-6 and D-7 through D-17.

The

defendant submits it is not necessary to show that each of the
defects mentioned existed on March 21, 1977; rather it is only
necessary to show that problems arose throughout the term of the
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lease, and that the cumulative effect of these problems made the
backhoe unfit for the normal purposes for which it is ordinarily
used.

Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 557 P. 2d 1009 (Utah,

1976).

This is what Mr. Babcock would have testified about had

he been permitted to do so.

[See POINT III supra].

Some of the defects such as the problems with the charging
system and the axle which broke on the job in Wellington, Utah,
obviously did not exist on March 21, 1977, because the alternator
and axle were replaced within a few days after Jay Tuft & Company
took possession of the backhoe.

[Ex. P-6].

Furthermore many of

the hydraulic problems, including the deterioration of the
hydraulic pumps, could be attributable to ordinary wear and tear
on the machine as testified to by defendant's expert witnesses
and also by plaintiffs' expert witnesses; [See POINTS I(3) and
(4) supra] and yet such problems became so numerous and substantial,
they made the backhoe unmerchantable simply by virtue of the
existence of the said problems.

Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,

supra.
By requiring the defendant to show that the defects all
existed on March 21, 1977, is to totally ignore the fact that the
lease agreement provided for monthly payments every thirty (30)
days, and consequently the "term" of the lease was for successive
periodic or monthly periods of time.

The trial judge recognized

this fact and instructed the jury as follows:

"This implied

warranty of merchantability attaches to the backhoe for each
separate monthly term during which time the EQUIPMENT LEASE
AGREEMENT was in effect."

[Instruction No. 27. (R. 370)].

Instruction nos. 25 and 29 are totally inconsistent with these
statements in instruction no. 27, and it would be impossible for
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the jury not to be confused by the said statements.

After first

instructing the jury in instruction no. 27 that a breach of
implied warranty of merchantability could be found for each
separate, successive, monthly term, the trial judge then only two
pages later in the instructions did a complete about face and
stated that the defendant could not recover unless it could prove
all the problems with the backhoe existed on March 21, 1977.
The courts have uniformly held that giving two inconsistent
instructions that would tend to confuse the jury constitutes
prejudicial error, and that giving a correct instruction cannot
cure the error in another contradictory erroneous instruction
even though the trial judge states the jury must consider the
instructions as a whole.
502 P. 2d 1034 (1972).

Smith v. Aberdeen, 7 Wash. App. 664,
Francis v. City and County of San Francisco,

282 P. 2d 456 (Calif. 1955); MacDonald Equipment Company v. McMillan
Construction Company, Colo. App., 480 P. 2d 589 (1971); Ieronimo
v. Hagerman, 93 Ariz. 357, 380 P. 2d 1013 (1963).
Finally by instructing the jury the defendant had to show by
a perponderance of the evidence there was no change in the mechanical condition of the backhoe from the time the lease connnenced
until such time as the backhoe experienced the mechanical difficulty
in question is an inaccurate statement of the law and an impossible
burden under the state of the evidence.

In the first place the

mechanical problem in Wellington in January, 1977 with the charging
system and axle had already been repaired on March 22, 1977, by
Shurtleff & Andrews mechanics [Ex. P-6] and therefore there was a
change in the mechanical condition of the backhoe after the lease
term commenced on March 21, 1977. and the change was caused by
mechanics dispatched by ASCO.

Moreover, the hydraulic problem in
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Alpine several successive days after November 16, 1977, were
represented to be corrected each night when Ray Baldwin replaced
unloading valves, etc.

The subsequent daily problems existed

from the day before from the new unloader valve, etc and not from
March 21, 1977.

Under these circumstances there was a change in

the mechanical condition caused by the plaintiffs own mechanic
yet no allowance is made in the instruction for that fact.
Finally, the instruction does not take into account the change in
mechanical conditions for ordinary wear and tear which all the
witnesses, both plaintiffs' and defendant's, testified would
require the replacement of parts and packing of hydraulic cylinders,
etc.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GIVING
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 DEALING WITH WAIVER BECAUSE IT USURPS THE
PROVINCE OF THE JURY TO WEIGH THE EVIDENCE AND AMOUNTS TO A
DIRECTED VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ON THIS ISSUE.
Instruction No. 20 reads as follows:
Where it is difficult to determine whether a
particular act merely sheds light on the meaning of
the agreement or represents a waiver of a term of the
agreement, the preference is in favor of waiver. Thus
even if you find that the plaintiff on occasion did not
charge the defendant for certain repairs or gave the
defendant credit for down time, the preferred interpretation
of such action is that the plaintiff waived its claim
against the defendant for those repairs and down time
not charged for rather that the interpretation of such
action constitutes a course of performance which indicates
an intent not to charge the defendant for any down time
or for any repairs.
[R. 363] .
The court's instruction was copied verbatim from the plaintiffs'
proposed instruction no. 28 [R. 327].

The defendant took timely

formal exception to the said instruction. [Tr. 982].
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The defendant submits the instruction amounted to both a
finding of fact and a review of the evidence by the trial judge
and takes away from the jurors the sole province which they had
to weigh the evidence and make a finding whether there was in
fact any so-called and alleged "waiver" or whether the gratuitous
repairs on past occasions represented a policy on the part of the
plaintiffs to render the future repairs also gratuitously.

The

trial judge effectively instructed the jury to find there was a
"waiver" and has taken away from the jury its function to determine
what weight should be given to Darrell Lester's exhibit P-21 and
the other evidence as it bore on the critical issue of who was to
pay for the repairs.

By interfering with the jury's province in

interpreting the evidence as it would relate to the issues of
"waiver" and gratuitous repairs [even assuming that waiver was a
relevant issue which defendant denies it was] the court has
corrrrnitted prejudicial error.

[Flynn v.Harlin Construction Co.,

29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P. 2d 356 ( 1973)].

This instruction is in

effect a directed verdict on the issue.

Durrant v. Pelton, 16 U.

2d 7, 394 P. 2d 879 (1964).
Plaintiffs' bookkeeper and office manager, Darrell Lester,
introduced an exhibit showing approximately three thousand dollars
($3,000.00) worth of repairs paid for by ASCO during the term of
the lease and which were not charged to the defendant.

[Ex. P-

21]. It also is clear the plaintiffs did, in fact, pay for all
the repairs that were made on the Murray job site to include the
replacement of a broken axle, replacement of alternator, etc.
[Ex. P-6. (Tr. )] .

This testimony had a direct bearing on the

issue of whether the repairs made to the backhoe would be made
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free of charge, or whether they should be billed to the defendant.
[See POINT I(3) infra], and the trial judge should have instructed
the jury to determine the relevancy of this evidence rather than
instructing them they must find a waiver.
There was not one shred of testimony from any of plaintiffs'
witnesses dealing with the issue of "waiver", as used in the
court's instruction no. 20.

None of these witnesses stated the

repairs were made free of charge because of any good samaritan
waiver.

There was in fact, no explanation by these witnesses as

to why Exhibit P-21 was offered into evidence.
The defendant submits the instruction is not a correct
statement of the law and has found no cases substantiating the
instruction.

Furthermore, the court failed to define the term

"waiver" and therefore it could only be confusing to the jury
to try to interpret it as used in the instruction and then relate
the term to the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant submits this
Honorable Supreme Court should reverse the JUDGMENT ON VERDICT OF
JURY appealed from and should set aside the jury verdict awarding
to the plaintiffs the sum of sixteen thousand six hundred fiftyone dollars and seventy-three cents ($16,651.73) for repairs to
the backhoe; and should further order a new trial on the remaining
issues raised in the plaintiffs' complaint dealing with the
alleged rentals which were due and owing and the defendant's
counterclaim dealing with loss of profits on the Alpine job.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
McMURRAY & ANDERSON
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